animal welfare

Should Vegans and Animal Rights Advocates Support Better Welfare in Animal Farming?

~ Graeme M ~ Leave a comment

The simple answer: Yes.

The longer answer: Many animal advocates express concern and outrage at the way animals are treated in even high welfare animal farming operations and certainly there are many examples where “welfare” practices are more about expedience and productivity than the well-being of the animals. However, while we can question some practices, the larger question is, should we openly encourage and support farmers to provide good welfare for their animals or is this tacitly endorsing animal exploitation?

At the heart of this question seems to be the idea of abolitionism vs welfarism, an idea that has been expressed most strongly by animal rights advocate Gary Francione and his stance against what he terms “New Welfarism”. Welfarism is the idea that animal use is acceptable, providing the animals are well cared for. Abolitionism on the other hand is the idea that the foundational right that other animals should attract is the right not to be property (ie to be free) and hence no animal use is morally acceptable, regardless of how well cared for the animals might be.

Welfarism does not necessarily demand an end to animal use, while abolitionism does. Francione worries that by combining the two ideas, we dilute the effectiveness of campaigning for animal liberation (ie, abolition of animal using industries). Such a combination he refers to as “New Welfarism”.

New welfarism is thus an approach which advocates for improving animal welfare whilst still aiming for animal rights and abolition of animal use. Francione is critical of this ‘soft option’ and argues that to ever achieve anything the animal rights movement needs to focus only the ultimate goal of total animal liberation and nothing else.

Moreover, Francione argues that by advocating for, and supporting, better welfare practices we are in essence condoning animal use. The idea that we should think that animal use is acceptable so long as the animals are treated well is a pernicious one to be resisted at all costs. Welfarists are not commited to abolishing animal use and hence have no place within a genuine rights-based framework.

Is this a reasonable strategy? My own view is that no, it isn’t because I believe it confuses welfare with welfarism. The former is entirely consistent with a rights-based framework for our relationship with other species, the latter disregards these rights. This is because when we worry about the wellbeing of animals we are not necessarily committing to the belief that their use and exploitation is acceptable.

To explain further, it is my view that we owe other species the same basic rights as we owe human beings, whenever we can do so (or choose to). The reason for the somewhat optional stance here is because for now, such rights are not formalised at law and hence the best any of us can do is choose to act as though these rights exist.

These basic rights – the rights to be free, in control of one’s own life and not to be treated cruelly – should serve to guide us in our actions. Because these three basic rights give rise to the concept of veganism (and indeed directly underpin the definition of veganism), vegans therefore are people who behave as though other animals have these rights (ie vegans seek to exclude – as far as is possible and practicable – all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals).

How does this guide us in relation to animal welfare?

Generally speaking, vegans will not support animal-using industries when they can choose otherwise because these industries typically violate all three basic rights. This lack of support usually takes the form of not buying products from animal-using industries so as to remove the stimulus for continued production.

If everyone followed this strategy, then clearly the animal-using industries would cease because economic support is withdrawn. However, for now this is not stopping animals being bred into the system and so there are animals in these industries whose most important basic rights have been violated. The only remaining right that people can help protect is their right not to be treated cruelly.

Therefore, while there are farmed animals, vegans seem to remain under a duty to advocate for better welfare in order to be consistent with the aim to prevent cruelty. By advocating for better welfare one is not endorsing the use of animals in animal-using industries but rather seeking to minimise violations of living animals’ rights (ie the right not to be treated cruelly). Of course, as noted above vegans are still not going to buy products from these industries, no matter how good the welfare.

We can see therefore that these industries would not continue just because these same non-consumers support their welfare efforts. On the other hand, a genuine welfarist – who argues that animal use is fine so long as welfare is fine – would continue to stimulate production with their economic support.

On these grounds, I think vegans should advocate for farmers to maximise welfare. In fact, some typical practices that vegans disapprove of should be endorsed rather than criticised. Let me offer two examples to which vegans/activists frequently object.

The first is AI (Artificial Insemination) and cow/calf separation in dairy farming. Critics regularly refer to this using highly perjorative language, frequently using human sensibilities to describe these practices. It is not uncommon to see advocates/activists talking about “rape”, “rape racks”, “fisting” and so on in order to cast the famers who use AI as something akin to sexual offenders. Clearly the aim is to arouse a negative sentiment in the observer such that they might be willing to consider abandoning dairy products.

I can understand the reasoning but given the actual benefits of AI in this context, it seems unfair to criticise farmers for doing this. Worse, it encourages anti-vegan objectors to ridicule activists for conflating human moral concerns with animals (and the consequent risk that activists are regarded as minimising concerns for human issues).

Instead I suggest that to be consistent with our duty to respect the rights of other animals, surely we should want farmers to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure the overal wellbeing of their animals, once they exist? In the case of dairy AI and cow/calf separation, the benefits include minmising the risk to the cow of being injured during mating, the use of sexed semen to minimise the problem of bobby calves, while also helping to reduce the risk of disease transmission to the calf, ensure adequate colostrum and feed intake, and to simplify disease detection.

Another example is the use of studded nose-rings in calves to prevent them suckling. Activists point to this as particularly inhumane and on the surface, it does look that way. Imagine hooking a pointed object into a calf’s nose to prevent it suckling from its mother? This seems the height of cruelty. Yet is it really?

As I understand it, these are mainly used on beef farms where calves do remain with their mothers until weaning. On dairy farms calves are typically separated from their mothers very early on (and this itself is a welfare measure).

The reason farmers use these rings is because calves don’t wean naturally on a farm. They will continue to suckle, which means the mother will continue to produce milk. Just as humans can physically produce milk for 5 or more years if a mother continues to feed her toddler and preschool aged child, a cow will also continue to produce while being suckled – but often at the detriment of her own health.

In the wild, the young would either be pushed out of the herd if male (to go find its own herd), or if female impregnated by the dominant male! On a farm, there are three options for weaning: complete separation while young (as in a dairy), separation at weaning age (between 5 and 12 months depending on the farm process), or using a device like this to allow the mother and calf to stay together but allow weaning.

While it might seem that the nose ring is the crueler of the three options, it’s actually the option that causes the least stress to both mother and calf. Weaning by separation causes a lot more stress on both in the short term but is completed much quicker. But it also requires a bigger land opportunity. You can’t just move either mother or calf into a different paddock if they are still in eyesight or earshot of each other as they will break through fences to get back to each other.

In the wild, nature takes care of itself through harsh measures. In domestic situations, humans must intervene and simulate the conditions that would occur in the wild. The nose ring (which is plastic and is a squeeze fit rather than a pierced fit) pemits a safe and efective way to wean the calf while allowing both to remain in contact.

In closing, let me hasten to add I am not proposing that vegans and animal rights activists advocate for welfare on the grounds that this make animal use perfectly fine. On the contrary, we should wish to prevent animal farming whenever that is possible – good welfare does not mean that we have the right to indiscriminate use of other animals. Rather, I am suggesting that to respect the rights of animals that do exist on farms, we should support policies and standards that aim to improve their welfare. When such conditions fall short, we should call attention to these failings and seek better.

The Philosophy of Ethical Veganism Explained

~ Graeme M ~ 6 Comments

My explanation of just what ethical veganism really is.

Summary:

Veganism is an ethical position, the idea that we extend moral concern to other (sentient) species. We are already vegan to other people, all that is in question is how much we can be vegan to other species.

Over thousands of years humans have developed moral principles about how to live well together. Some of these principles have been described as human rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets out a generally agreed set of such rights that can and should apply to all people in any society.

The basic, or foundational subset of these are the three rights described at Articles 3-5 of this Declaration. These are the rights to one’s own life, the right to be free and not treated as property or exclusively as a means to an end, and the right not to be treated cruelly.

There are reasons to believe that these basic rights can be extended to many other species. Simply put, we should want other species to be free and in charge of their own lives without being treated badly by us, as much as is possible.

While human rights are often protected at law, animal rights are not. Vegans therefore are people who behave as though these rights for other species are protected. This makes it very easy to work out what to do whenever we can, even if it turns out that the best that we can do can never eliminate the use of other animals for human ends.

The Full Story

Humans have long been engaged in an ethical project (cf Philip Kitcher). Today it is accepted that people deserve certain moral considerations such as to be free to conduct their own lives, to not be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to not be held in slavery, and to have their interests protected at law. People also deserve to be treated justly. Justice is understood to mean fair treatment and for the victims of unfair treatment to be protected (and perhaps for the perpetrators of unfair treatment to receive punishment).

These ethical principles have been embedded in what are known as human rights. In particular the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets out in 30 articles the fundamental human rights to be universally protected. Generally speaking rights and just treatment are confined to our species.

Ethical Veganism is the idea that the principles expressed by three of these fundamental rights – Articles 3-5 of the Declaration – should be extended to other species whenever possible. Vegans believe that we owe a moral obligation to other species to respect their rights to their own lives, not be enslaved and not be subjected to cruel treatment or torture, whenever we can.

This makes it very easy to evaluate what choices and behaviours we should enact in regard to other species. It also offers a clear distinction about those who endorse veganism and those who advocate for animal rights.

Human rights are protected in law – legislation in many different countries seeks to constrain people to observing these rights. Animal rights however are not well protected in law. Because this is the case, people who endorse veganism behave as though those rights are protected, while animal rights advocates also agitate to have those rights protected in law.

While people who endorse veganism choose to act as though animals’ rights are protected, their behaviours will depend to some extent on circumstances. This means that in some cases, animals may still be used and harmed for human needs.

For example, someone living where access to food is limited might own animals from whom food and fibre is collected or obtained. People living in traditional communities with limited access to modern goods and services might continue to hunt other animals for food and fibre. Animals might be used in the pursuit of medical treatments where the outcome can be shown to benefit many.

Generally speaking however, when one lives where circumstances permit then one should make choices that aim to respect and protect the rights of other species. In other words, it is up to the individual how best to act so as to protect other species. For example, they may choose to eat a plant-based diet.

People sometimes argue that farming animals as well as growing crops for food might be preferable to growing only crops. For example, they describe regenerative farming as the most ethical option. It seems to me that this argument is open to debate on empirical grounds, given there is some dispute about the overall efficacy of regenerative agriculture. I cannot adjudicate on that. However, as a broad stance based on my explanation above and within the context of the idea that other species deserve basic rights, it should be clear that animal farming is not ethical.

Our ethical concern in regard to animal farming emerges from its failure to observe the three principles above. We might be able to make farming relatively cruelty free, but we cannot make the animals free or unexploited nor prevent their ultimate harm. Therefore, while minimising pain and suffering in animal farming is consistent with our duty to prevent cruelty, animal welfare in the context of human use of other species falls short of our overall ethical obligation.

Because animal farming fails to fully respect the rights of other species as explained above, people who endorse veganism as an ethical stance will more than likely choose not to buy products derived from animal farming and will prefer to buy and use goods that have been produced without the use and exploitation of other animals, whenever they can. Of course, in the broader sense it might turn out that it simply is not possible to prevent the use of animals completely, if at all, because that is just the way things are. We may simply have to face the fact that whatever ethical failure accrues from this, it is the best we can do in the circumstances.